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REMARKS

If the democrats recapture the White House and win half a dozen more
seats in the Senate, it will be time to rethink and redevelop the U.S. relationship
with international law. Such a reconsideration might properly begin with a
review of our relation with the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
It is not my contention that U.S. foreign relations policy should be subject,
first, last, and always, to the adjudicatory power of the World Court applying
standards of international law. It never has been. When it comes to the
residual, special, and spare role that will still need to be played by the United
States in the maintenance of international peace through the deployment of
preponderant force, there can be no realistic substitution for the political
discretion ofthose empowered by the American democratic process. Certainly,
although our faith in that discretion has been shaken by its recent abuse,
American political discretion cannot simply be displaced by a group of fifteen
world jurists, no matter how eminent.
However, I do contend that in those matters as to which the United States
deliberately agrees to subordinate its discretion to a specific rule in a treaty or
customary law, and then, a dispute arises as to the specific meaning of that rule,
it is usually appropriate and in keeping with American traditional respect for
the rule of law that this interpretative function be delegated to an impartial
judicial body, rather than that the rule be left to the interpretative discretion of
the United States-its political or judicial organs-as well as to the other
interested parties. Otherwise, if treaties are left open, first and last, to
interpretation by the disputing parties, they become essentially useless as
instruments for avoiding and resolving conflict.
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All members of the United Nations (UN) are parties to the Statute of the
ICJ. However, states subject themselves of the ICJ jurisdiction only to the
extent they agree to do so.'
Under article 36(2) of the Court's Statute, states may agree to submit to
ICJ jurisdiction in any matter pertaining to international law-whether in
connection with one dispute or any future disputes-subject to such specific,
targeted exclusions as the state may specify.2
While the United States, in 1945, had agreed to accept the ICJ 36(2)
jurisdiction, it did so subject to the "Connally Reservation" which specifically
excluded all "domestic [matters] .

.

. as determined by the United States of

America.",3 This was a formal acceptance without real adherence, demonstrating not U.S. subordination to the rule of law but a penchant for hypocrisy and
too-clever-by-half lawyering.
In April 1984, after learning that Nicaragua was about to file suit against
the United States, the State Department notified the World Court that it was
altering American acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction, with immediate
effect, to exclude "disputes with any Central American state."4
On October 7, 1985, the United States dropped the other shoe, by giving notice
of the termination of all acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction under article
36(2) of the Statute of the ICJ.
To a considerable extent, the multilateralists have themselves to blame.
Throughout a long campaign to implement their program, they repeatedly
settled for self-contradictory compromises and fictions. Once the Connally
Reservation had been added, the 1946 Senate acceptance of the World Court's
compulsory jurisdiction was little more than disguised rejection.
Currently, sixty-six countries have accepted some form of article 36(2)
general compulsory jurisdiction.'
The advent of a new administration in 2009 suggests the timeliness of a
reevaluation of the U.S. relationship to the ICJ, and specifically, to its
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jurisdiction under article 36(2). I propose the following form of qualified
acceptance of this jurisdiction:
The government of the United States accepts in conformity with
paragraph 2 of article 36 of the Statute of the ICJ, until such time as
notice may be given to terminate such acceptance, as compulsory ipso
facto and without special agreement, and on the basis and condition
of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the ICJ in any dispute arising after
the date of this acceptance.
The acceptance of the jurisdiction of the court made by this declaration
under paragraph 2 of article 36 of the Statute of the ICJ shall apply to all
disputes other than disputes relating to or connected with facts or situations of
hostilities, armed conflicts, individual or collective actions taken in selfdefense, resistance to aggression, fulfillment of obligations imposed by
international bodies, and other similar or related acts, measures, or situations
in which the United States is, has been, or may in the future be, involved.
This limited reservation to our acceptance of the ICJ article 36(2) general
jurisdiction is not something new. Twelve countries have attached similar
reservations, excluding jurisdiction over military disputes. Among them are
Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Kenya, and Nigeria.
My reasons for proposing a positive reevaluation of U.S. acceptance of
article 36(2) jurisdiction are the following:
a)

b)

c)

The United States has always been a proponent of the rule of
law in international relations, this being a natural extension of
a foundational value in our domestic system of governance;
For most of its history, the United States has taken its legal
obligations seriously. Despite the record of the past eight years,
we are much more likely than not, in the future, to revert to our
historic practice of acting in compliance with our international
legal obligations, giving us little to fear and much to expect
from judicial review of the law-comporting behavior of
ourselves and of other states;
After eight years of pretending that, as the sole superpower, the
United States can always and everywhere defend or advance its
interests by recourse to force or the threat of force, we are
learning that this is a false and self-defeating premise. In the
future, when power is once again seen to be disaggregated and
no one actor can credibly claim an unchallengeable preeminence
of power, resort to law will be for us, as it is for other nations,
a more productive strategy for advancing the multivariegated
national interest than is reliance solely on the illusion of
preponderant force. The next administration will administer a
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new era in which international law is again seen as serving the
U.S. national interest and in which law-observant behavior
again is the norm that guides decision-making in Washington.
In such circumstances, a strong commitment to adjudication is
the natural concomitant of a renewed commitment to the rule of
law in international affairs.
In practice, in the international system, resort to law must mean recourse
to the jurisdiction of international tribunals, of which the ICJ is primus inter
pares.
If we do make this move to reposition ourselves under the jurisdiction of
the ICJ in all matters pertaining to disputes arising under international treaty
and customary law, it may also be necessary to address the role, in U.S. law, of
decisions of the ICJ insofar as these interpret treaty rights and duties.
Specifically, Congress, at a minimum, should hold hearings to determine how
best to exercise its legislative power to ensure that one or several non-compliant
states of the Union cannot vitiate the effect, and deny to all Americans the
benefits, of treaties entered into by the President with the advice and consent
of two-thirds of the Senate. How can Congress ensure that treaties, as the
constitution envisages, actually are "the supreme law of the land"?6 As matters
stand, subsequent to the Supreme Court's Medellin decision,7 there is no real
incentive for other states to enter into treaties with us, as they would be
exchanging their binding commitment for an essentially worthless promise by
Washington to see what it can do to obtain the voluntary compliance of the fifty
states of the Union. Such an impediment to the sovereign ability of the nation
to obligate itself, and to promote the obligation of other states, is not in the
national interest and must not be allowed to impede full American participation
in the international legal system.
A new administration in Washington is more likely than its predecessor to
see participation in a cooperative international legal system as being in its
national interest. The prior administration has done much to hobble such
participation. Its successor will have much to do, and to undo, if we are to
resume our rightful place in a system which we cannot dominate, but in which
our influence, wisely deployed, can produce significant dividends.
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